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We address Jacoby’s (1991) proposal that strategic control over knowledge requires
conscious awareness of that knowledge. In a two-grammar artificial grammar learning
experiment all participants were trained on two grammars, consisting of a regularity in
letter sequences, while two other dimensions (colours and fonts) varied randomly.
Strategic control was measured as the ability to selectively apply the grammars during
classification. For each classification, participants also made a combined judgement of
(a) decision strategy and (b) relevant stimulus dimension. Strategic control was found
for all types of decision strategy, including trials where participants claimed to lack con-
scious structural knowledge. However, strong evidence of strategic control only occurred
when participants knew or guessed that the letter dimension was relevant, suggesting that
strategic control might be associated with – or even causally requires – global awareness of
the nature of the rules even though it does not require detailed knowledge of their content.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The ability to strategically control the influence of knowledge on behaviour is regarded by many as indicating that the
knowledge is conscious (e.g., Baars, 1988; Jacoby, 1991). However, this assumption has been challenged by empirical find-
ings showing that unconsciously perceived stimuli can interfere with tasks traditionally thought to require strategic control
(Lau & Passingham, 2007; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 2007; Van Gaal & Lamme, 2012; Van Gaal, Ridderinkhof,
Scholte, & Lamme, 2010). The idea of unconscious executive control is also inherent in Dienes and Perner’s (2007) cold con-
trol theory of hypnosis. In the present study we address whether and to what extent strategic control over the application of
2 rule sets in artificial grammar learning (AGL; Reber, 1967) requires conscious structural knowledge of those rule sets.
Strategic control can be measured by comparing performance in situations where the person tries versus tries not to
engage in some act, i.e. situations that require ‘‘opposition logic”. For example, Jacoby’s (1991) Process Dissociation Proce-
dure aims to identify dissociations between automatic and intentional application of knowledge by comparing performance
under conditions where participants are instructed to apply, versus withhold, certain knowledge. This logic has been applied
to implicit learning experiments, including artificial grammar learning (AGL; Reber, 1967, 1993). In AGL, participants initially
observe or memorize a series of nonword letter strings where the identity and order of letters is determined by a complexsex.ac.uk
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as a grammar. In a subsequent test phase they judge the grammaticality of a series of novel letter strings.
Consciousness of acquired knowledge can be assessed by various subjective awareness measures (Pasquali, Timmermans,
& Cleeremans, 2010; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). If participants are trained on two different
grammars, strategic control can be measured by asking them to selectively apply their knowledge of one of these grammars
over a given block of test trials (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 2008; see also Higham, Vokey, &
Pritchard, 2000). An alternative procedure – argued to require a higher degree of strategic control – is to let the classification
rule vary randomly between individual trials (Norman, Price, & Jones, 2011). Translated to opposition logic, such classifica-
tion judgements require the ‘‘inclusion” of strings that follow the target grammar and ‘‘exclusion” of strings that follow the
irrelevant grammar. The same logic has been applied to implicit sequence learning in the serial reaction time (SRT) task
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Here strategic control is measured as the ability to avoid generating regularities from the trained
sequence under exclusion as opposed to under inclusion instructions (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Fu, & Dienes,
2008; Goschke, 1998; Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006; Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). More demandingly, it has been mea-
sured as participants’ ability to indicate anticipated target positions when the instructed relation between the spatial loca-
tion of the anticipated target and the spatial location of a manual response varies across trials (Norman, Price, Duff, &
Mentzoni, 2007). Using these procedures, strategic control has been identified both in AGL and SRT learning.
One of Jacoby’s central assumptions, which is consistent with Baars’ (1988) Global Workspace Theory, is that strategic
control over the application of knowledge requires conscious awareness. In memory experiments, this is taken to specifically
require conscious recollection of previously exposed stimuli. One example is word stem completion under exclusion instruc-
tions, where participants complete a series of word stems with words that have not been presented earlier (Jacoby, Toth, &
Yonelinas, 1993). According to Jacoby et al., the controlled suppression of a word that comes to mind during this task
requires participants to consciously recollect having seen the word during training. This in turn requires accurate source
identification – i.e., that one consciously attributes generated words to previous exposure (Buchner, Erdfelder, Steffens, &
Martensen, 1997; Yu & Bellezza, 2000). In contrast, words that come to mind which are not attributed to previous exposure
are more likely to be reported contrary to instruction.
In the current paper we explore the extent to which strategic control over the application of two learned grammars in AGL
is limited to instances where participants attribute their classification responses to conscious decision strategies, and/or
where there is conscious awareness of which stimulus dimension was relevant to the grammaticality decision. The question
is relevant to the proposed distinction between two forms of knowledge that may be acquired in AGL: (a) judgement knowl-
edge – i.e. knowledge of whether a certain letter string is grammatical, and (b) structural knowledge – i.e. knowing the
detailed structure of the grammar (Dienes & Scott, 2005). What we ask is whether and to what extent the ability to strate-
gically control one’s grammaticality judgement requires conscious structural knowledge.
In AGL, whether structural knowledge of grammar rules is conscious or unconscious can be assessed in at least two dif-
ferent ways. First it can be assessed by asking participants, on every test trial, to report the decision strategy they used to
arrive at their classification judgement (Dienes & Scott, 2005). If participants report using ‘‘explicit rules” or ‘‘memories”
one would infer the involvement of conscious structural knowledge. However if they report using ‘‘random choice”, ‘‘intu-
ition”, or ‘‘familiarity”, commonly referred to as ‘‘implicit” decision strategies, one would infer that any above-chance clas-
sification performance reflected unconscious structural knowledge (Scott & Dienes, 2008). In both SRT and AGL experiments,
it has been found that strategic control can occur even for decisions attributed to implicit strategies (Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010;
Wan et al., 2008). Second, whether structural knowledge of grammar rules is conscious or unconscious can be assessed by
asking participants to identify which stimulus dimension(s) are relevant to the learned rules. If participants report that the
rules were related to a dimension that was indeed relevant to the rules, e.g., the selection and ordering of letters in AGL, one
would infer that they might have conscious structural knowledge. By contrast, the unconscious nature of structural knowl-
edge could be safely inferred if participants report that they thought the rules were related to stimulus dimensions that were
in fact irrelevant. For instance, if letter strings in AGL contained additional random variation in colour which was irrelevant
to the grammar, a participant truthfully attributing the rule to colour variations only, would not have correct conscious
structural knowledge. There is already some evidence that even participants who misattribute the nature of acquired rules
to irrelevant stimulus properties may still strategically control the application of knowledge, both in AGL (Norman et al.,
2011) and SRT experiments (Norman et al., 2007).
It may be argued that the two measures reflect different properties of structural knowledge: Self-reported decision strat-
egy reflects the extent to which participants feel they applied conscious structural knowledge and/or conscious judgement
knowledge, whereas reported rule-dimension awareness, i.e., the extent to which participants reported that their decision
involved the letter dimension, reflects the accuracy of participants’ hypotheses about of the nature of the grammar. The
two may often converge, as when making an intuitive judgement relating to an irrelevant stimulus dimension, which would
be a strong indication that structural knowledge was indeed unconscious, or conversely applying a conscious rule that
relates to a relevant stimulus dimension. However, the two may also diverge. For instance, a consciously applied rule
may well relate to one or more irrelevant stimulus properties (e.g., ‘‘when a word contains many purple letters and at least
one letter is written in italics it must belong to Grammar A”).
It could also be argued that used individually, both measures have limitations. First, they reflect different properties of
structural knowledge: Self-reported decision strategies reflect whether participants feel they applied conscious versus
unconscious structural knowledge, whereas reported rule awareness reflects whether the content of participants’ hypotheses
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on the absolute accuracy of participants’ relatively complex metacognitive appraisals of their own performance, they are
potentially subject to response bias. Used in combination, the two measures could provide a more conservative criterion
of unconscious structural knowledge, namely that two forms of ‘‘source misattribution” must be jointly present.
Used in combination, the two measures could provide an assessment of the extent to which structural grammar knowl-
edge is conscious or unconscious that does not contain these limitations. If strategic control is found also in cases when
structural knowledge is unconscious according to both criteria in combination, this would provide strong evidence against
Jacoby’s view. If one but not the other measure of consciousness over structural knowledge is required for strategic control to
occur, a combination of the two would give us more refined insight into what, if any, form of conscious structural knowledge
must be present in order for people to be able to apply knowledge strategically.
In the reported experiment we explored the extent to which strategic control of grammar classifications required con-
scious structural knowledge when both criteria are applied. Following Norman et al. (2011), the classification rule varied
randomly between grammars across individual trials. Additionally, the true nature of the grammars (only governed by letter
identity and order) was disguised by constructing letter strings that contained random variation on stimulus dimensions
(colour, font) that were unrelated to the artificial grammars. The difference between this procedure and previous AGL pro-
cedures applying multi-dimensional stimuli (Eitam, Schul, & Hassin, 2009) is therefore that only one dimension was relevant
to the rules. To measure whether structural knowledge was conscious or unconscious we applied a combined trial-by-trial
self-report measurement of decision strategy and of which stimulus dimension the classification decision related to.
If participants showed strategic control on trials that were both attributed to implicit decision strategies and to stimulus
dimensions other than letters i.e., when claiming to be unaware of the structural aspects of the stimuli that motivated their
decision – this would support the hypothesis that unconscious structural knowledge can be strategically applied, and
thereby challenge Jacoby’s (1991) assumption that strategic control depends on conscious awareness. If strategic control
depended on conscious structural knowledge as measured by a combination of the two measures, i.e., if it only occurred
on trials where participants felt that they were applying conscious rule knowledge related to the relevant stimulus dimen-
sion, this could be taken to support Jacoby’s assumption.
2. Method
120 Norwegian students (60 females, 60 males) aged 18–41 (M = 22.5, SD = 3.0) took part in two training phases. In each
phase they viewed letter strings from a different finite-state grammar (grammar A versus B, order counterbalanced across
participants). Grammars and letter strings were taken from Dienes et al. (1995, see Fig. 1). The AGL task was programmed
in E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a, 2002b) and displayed by a 1900 monitor. In each training phase,
each of 32 letter strings was presented three times, one at a time, in random order.
Strings consisted of 5–9 letters (X, V, M, R, T), with each letter written on one of five coloured backgrounds (red, purple,
blue, green, black) and in one of five different font styles (bold, italics, normal, outline, underline). Colour and font of each
letter varied randomly (see Fig. 2). Instructions were to examine each string closely during its 7500 ms display period. To
ensure participants attended all 3 stimulus dimensions, they were cued post-trial to report either the letter (8 trials), colour
(8 trials), or font (8 trials) of a randomly chosen string element on 24 randomly selected trials in each training phase. This
and all other responses were indicated by a mouse click. After the two training phases, participants were informed that letter
strings were governed by a different complex rule in each phase. On each of 60 subsequent test trials, three novel letter
strings were presented simultaneously in a vertical column – one grammar A string, one grammar B string, and one ungram-
matical string. Each string type occurred equally often in each screen position (i.e., upper, middle and lower). Following the
procedure by Norman et al. (2011), participants’ task was to select either the string obeying grammar A or grammar B item,
with target grammar varying randomly between individual trials and indicated by a written cue (‘‘Rule 1?”/‘‘Rule 2?”) dis-
played above the letter strings.
After each classification judgement participants made a two-step trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy. The first
step was a multiple-choice evaluation of decision strategy with 3 alternatives presented in a vertical row on the screen,
namely ‘‘random choice”, ‘‘feelings (of intuition or familiarity)”, or ‘‘rule/specific memory”. The ‘‘implicit” decision strategies
‘‘random choice”, and ‘‘feelings” represent claims by participants that they were not aware of the structural aspects of the
stimuli that motivated their decision (i.e., any structural knowledge was unconscious). Trials attributed to ‘‘feelings” differ
from those attributed to ‘‘random choice” because, in the former case, the participant claims to be aware of knowing whether
they categorized correctly, even if they do not know why (i.e., judgment knowledge is conscious in the former but not latter
case). The ‘‘explicit” decision strategy ‘‘rule/specific memory” (henceforth ‘‘explicit strategies”) represents claims by partic-
ipants that they were aware of relevant structural properties and indicate that both judgement knowledge and structural
knowledge are conscious. (See Dienes (2008, 2012) for further explication of structural and judgment knowledge.) After
making this decision they were asked to indicate which stimulus dimension(s) they thought were relevant to their decision.
The response alternatives ‘‘letters”, ‘‘colours”, and ‘‘fonts” (with the order counterbalanced across participant) were pre-
sented below each decision strategy category. For ‘‘random choice” and ‘‘feelings”, participants were instructed that if they
did not think/feel that any particular dimension(s) was/were relevant, they were supposed to guess the relevant dimension
(s). Trials where participants attributed their decision to letters (alone or in combination with other dimensions) were
Fig. 1. The two finite-state grammars used in the experiments, grammar A (top), and grammar B (bottom).
Fig. 2. Three different examples of how the letter string ‘‘XXRVTM” (grammar A, Dienes et al., 1995) may appear with random variation in colour and font.
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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received a questionnaire in which they were instructed to allocate 12 points between the three stimulus dimensions (letter,
colour, font) in a way that reflected the extent to which they thought each dimension had contributed to the grammar rules.
Conservatively, only participants who allocated 0 points to letter were classified as unaware, and all others were classified as
potentially aware.
3. Results
The mean percentage of trials on which participants reported the correct letter, colour, or font of a randomly chosen
string element during the training phase was high (M = 85.6, SD = 10.0), indicating that participants were attending to all
3 stimulus dimensions.
Strategic control was expressed as strategic scores (Dienes et al., 1995), defined as the proportion of consistent strings cho-
sen out of all consistent and inconsistent strings. A consistent string is one that follows the target grammar, while an incon-
sistent string is one that follows the nontarget grammar.1 Strategic control over the application of the two grammars would
result in scores above the .5 chance level.1 A flattening constant of 0.5 was used: Proportions were calculated as (consistent + 0.5)/(consistent + inconsistent + 1), corresponding to a Bayesian prior
belief worth one observation that the proportion is 0.5.
Table 1
Means and statistics for the different response categories. Values are reported for all participants, and also separately for unaware participants.
Na Strategic score t-test compared to chance (.5) Cohen’s effect size d
M(SD) t(df)
[CI95] p(2-tailed) [CI95]
BH[0,.10]
All participants
Random + correct dimension 73 .55 (.16) 2.70 (72) .32
[.51, .59] .01 [.08, .55]
7.86
Feelings + correct dimension 77 .57 (.17) 3.53 (76) .40
[.53, .61] .001 [.16, .63]
141.63
Explicit + correct dimension 53 .60 (.24) 3.17 (52) .44
[.54, .67] .003 [.15, .72]
93.90
Random + incorrect dimension 70 .47 (.20) 1.25 (69) .15
[.42, .52] .22 [.38, .09]
.08
Feelings + incorrect dimension 65 .53 (.20) 1.20 (64) .15
[.48, .58] .24 [.10, .39]
1.08
Explicit + incorrect dimension 30 .52 (.21) .65 (29) .12
[.45, .60] .52 [.24, .48]
.56
Unaware participants
Random 20 .51 (.14) .18 (19) .04
[.44, .57] .86 [.40, .48]
.38
Feelings 19 .57 (.16) 1.80 (18) .41
[.49, .64] .09 [.06, .88]
2.64
Explicit 12 .54 (.22) .70 (11) .20
[.41, .68] .50 [.37, .77]
.87
a Note: N differs between cells according to how many participants had responses within response category in question.
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matical letter strings on less than a third of the trials. In addition, 4 of these participants who were defined as outliers
because their mean strategic score was more than 2SD above the group mean, were also excluded from the analyses.
To examine the relationship between strategic control and awareness of the relevant dimension we compared strategic
scores for trials on which the person chose the letter dimension, alone or in combination with other dimensions, with strate-
gic scores for trials on which the person did not choose the letter dimension. A dependent sample t-test showed evidence of
higher strategic scores on trials correctly attributed to letters [t(72) = 2.98, p = .004, BH[0,.10] = 31.44].2
Secondly, we compared participants’ strategic scores to the chance level of .5 for 6 different types of trial; i.e., trials on
which the three different types of decision strategy were given, either under conditions where the correct stimulus dimen-
sion was reported or under conditions where the correct stimulus dimension was not reported. Detailed results are pre-
sented in Table 1. We report confidence intervals on effect sizes and Bayes factors in addition to NHST p-values, so that
the reader can assess both the strength of evidence and conventional significance levels for any effects (Cumming, 2012;
Dienes, 2014).
For random choice, feelings, and explicit trials where the correct stimulus dimension was reported, the Bayes factor was
above 3, suggesting substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis above the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014, 2015), in
this case that strategic control was higher than what would be expected by chance. We also computed the 95% confidence
interval (CI95) for each of these effect sizes using the CIdeltaIND worksheet of the Exploratory Software for Confidence Inter-
vals (ESCI) that runs under Microsoft Excel and is based on noncentral t distributions (Cumming & Finch, 2001). These CI95
did not include an effect size of zero for any of the three decision strategies (see also Fig. 3). T-tests comparing performance2 BH[0,.10] refers to a Bayes factor used to test the hypothesis that strategic scores are above chance level of .5, represented as a half-normal with a SD of .10
above chance level, against the H0, the hypothesis of chance performance. The estimated SD of .10 was chosen based on data from a comparable previous study
(Norman et al., 2011) as well as unpublished data (Norman, Scott, Price, Jones, & Dienes, 2016). A B of 3 or above indicates substantial evidence for the
alternative above the null hypothesis, a B of 1/3 or below indicates substantial evidence for the null above the alternative hypothesis, and a B between 1/3 and 3
indicates data insensitivity for distinguishing between the alternative and null hypotheses (Dienes, 2014, 2015).
Fig. 3. Comparison of strategic scores to chance for each combination of attribution judgement and rule-dimension awareness, expressed as the point
estimates of Cohen’s effect size d, and the CI95 of their population estimate (d) for each condition. The red reference line indicates an effect size of zero. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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sion was reported.
There was less evidence for strategic control when participants reported the incorrect stimulus. For random choice trials,
the Bayes factor was below 1/3, supporting the null hypothesis, i.e., that strategic scores were not different from chance level
on these trials. However, for feelings and explicit trials on which the correct dimension was not reported, the range of the
Bayes factors (1/3–3) indicated insensitivity for distinguishing between the alternative hypothesis and the null hypotheses.
An effect size of zero lay within the CI95 for all three decision strategies, none of which showed a conventional significance
level above chance.
Separate analyses were specifically conducted on the strategic scores of those participants who, when asked about the
nature of the grammar rules after the experiment, allocated zero points to the letter dimension (see Table 1). For all three
types of decision strategy the range of the Bayes factors (1/3–3) indicated insensitivity, and t-tests showed no strong
evidence that strategic control occurred in the absence of conscious awareness.
4. Discussion
Evidence of strategic control occurred for all types of decision strategy, including trials attributed to random choice, feel-
ings, and explicit rules/memory. This suggests that participants were still able to apply their grammar knowledge in a strategic
and flexible manner even when they felt that their classification judgements did not involve conscious rule knowledge (i.e.,
for random choice and feelings trials). The finding is consistent with previous results reported by Wan et al. (2008), where
strategic control over the application of two finite-state grammars was reported even for trials attributed to familiarity, intu-
ition, and random choice. It is also consistent with the results of Fu et al. (2010), who reported significant strategic control in
SRT learning even on trials attributed to implicit decision strategies, when strategic control was operationalized as the ability
to suppress learned sequence regularities on a generation exclusion task.
The novel contribution of our study is that strong evidence of strategic control was limited to trials on which participants
attributed their responses to the correct stimulus dimension, alone or in combination with other stimulus dimensions. For
trials where the participant expressed that their grammar classification was made on the basis of a random choice, this result
appears robust. When participants reported the classification to be based on feelings or explicit rules/memory, the results are
qualified by Bayesian analyses; these indicate that data are too insensitive to confidently accept the null hypothesis that par-
ticipants lack strategic control over grammar classification. Nevertheless our data broadly show that there is more substan-
tial evidence for strategic control when the correct stimulus dimension is reported.
For trials attributed to explicit strategies, it is perhaps unsurprising that evidence of strategic control was weaker when
the incorrect stimulus dimension was reported. If a participant erroneously responds on the basis of an imagined rule or a
misleading memory that are related to an irrelevant dimension (i.e., colour and/or font), poor classification accuracy is
exactly what would be predicted.
However our results are at least suggestive that conscious focus on the correct stimulus dimension may also be important
during more implicitly guided responses – i.e., on trials attributed to a random choice or feelings. One interpretation of this is
that although strategic control can occur on trials where implicit decision strategies are applied, it nevertheless requires
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control requires a degree of consciousness. Decision strategy and dimension attribution may reflect different properties of
structural knowledge. As stressed by Dienes and Scott (2005), structural knowledge is complex and may encompass ‘‘knowl-
edge of particular items, knowledge of fragments of items, knowledge of other types of rules, or knowledge embedded in
connectionist weights” (p. 339). These may dissociate in terms of their conscious availability and in the extent to which they
are is associated with strategic control.
An alternative, but perhaps less parsimonious, interpretation is that strategic control is possible without any degree of
conscious structural knowledge: On trials attributed to a random choice or feelings, unconscious structural knowledge might
influence not only strategic control, but also judgements of the relevant stimulus dimension. In other words, when partic-
ipants did not feel that they had structural knowledge, and therefore indicated that they were responding on the basis of a
random choice or feelings, their guess about the relevant dimension could in principle have been influenced by unconscious
structural knowledge of the grammars. From this perspective, awareness of stimulus dimension could be seen as a conse-
quence of unconscious structural knowledge rather than as a necessary condition for strategic control. This would be con-
sistent with a recent study by a Mealor, Dienes, and Scott (2014) exemplifying how nonconscious priming may create
nonspecific, ‘‘free-floating familiarity” (p. 231) which in turn may influence classification performance in AGL learning unless
its source is made salient. Under this interpretation, our findings would contribute to explorations of how unconscious struc-
tural knowledge of artificial grammars may furtively influence people’s analytic decisions about the sources of that
knowledge.
A third possibility is that strategic control is always mediated by conscious structural knowledge on trials where the cor-
rect stimulus dimension is expressed, whatever participants’ reported decision strategy. In other words participants’ reports
that trials were based on a random choice or feelingsmay have reflected a response bias instead of being a reliable measure of
the contents of their conscious experience. However, we find it unlikely that participants had full conscious insight into the
grammar rules, or even that they often had any strong conviction that grammar rules were related to letters. First, the pro-
portion of trials on which participants failed to express full awareness was substantial: On average, participants attributed
their classifications to dimensions other than letters (i.e., colours and/or fonts) on more than 1/3 of trials. Second, previous
studies have argued that decision strategy judgements are sensitive to differences in conscious rule-knowledge of AGL
strings. For instance, the tendency to repeatedly make the same errors across trials has been shown to be more frequent
for explicit than implicit decision strategies (Dienes & Scott, 2005), and the reported basis for grammaticality judgments
made for the same test strings at two consecutive time points has been shown to follow a clear pattern of increasing levels
of metacognition (Scott & Dienes, 2010). Third, the relative frequency of the three decision strategy responses in our study
did not differ markedly from previous studies where these ratings have been argued to reflect conscious experience in an
accurate manner (e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005).
The absence of strong evidence for strategic control, during trials that were reported to be based on irrelevant stimulus
dimensions, may appear inconsistent with previous findings by Norman et al. (2007, 2011), which have demonstrated strate-
gic control among participants who express unawareness of the correct stimulus dimension on a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire and argued that this may be understood as a case of ‘‘fringe consciousness”. However, as stressed above, our
current data for feelings trials that were attributed to incorrect stimulus dimensions were too insensitive to confidently dis-
tinguish between the null hypothesis and the possibility of strategic control. It is also possible that our current use of trial-
by-trial ratings – by contrast to a single rating made at the end of the experiment – would prompt participants’ attention
towards the likely nature of the rule. The procedure could encourage people to reflect more about the nature of the rules,
to form hypotheses about the rules, and to even ‘‘test out” these hypotheses during the test phase by comparing the occur-
rence of various combinations of stimulus properties across different letter strings. In turn, this would tend to reduce the
likelihood that veridical feelings would occur in the absence of correct guesses about the rule dimension. The results of
the current experiment may not therefore be directly comparable to Norman et al. (2007, 2011), and future studies should
consider the extent to which procedural variations may encourage participants to make more analytical or more intuitive
decisions.
Our results highlight that greater precision is required in our understanding of what people do not need to be aware of,
and what they do need to be aware of, if they are to show strategic control over implicit knowledge. Taken together, the
weight of evidence from the current experiment indicates that strategic control over implicitly learned AGL strings is asso-
ciated with conscious awareness of the broad nature of the grammar.Author note
This research was supported by a project grant from the Meltzer foundation. We thank Oskar Blakstad for his contribu-
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